The Mechanic\u27s Lien Filed Despite a No-Lien Stipulation: Methods of Prevention and Removal by Ominksy, Harris
Volume 72 
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 72, 
1967-1968 
1-1-1968 
The Mechanic's Lien Filed Despite a No-Lien Stipulation: Methods 
of Prevention and Removal 
Harris Ominksy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Harris Ominksy, The Mechanic's Lien Filed Despite a No-Lien Stipulation: Methods of Prevention and 
Removal, 72 DICK. L. REV. 223 (1968). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol72/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Di in on lato &biebi
Vol. 72 WINTER, 1968 No. 2
THE MECHANIC'S LIEN FILED DESPITE A NO-LIEN
STIPULATION: METHODS OF PREVENTION
AND REMOVAL
By HARRIS OMINSKY*
The Pennsylvania Mechanics' Lien Law of 19631 offers broad
protection to construction contractors by providing a high priority
security device to enforce payment for labor and materials fur-
nished in a building project. Although a contractor may seldom
need to use the mechanic's lien, when he does the consequences
to the property owner and construction lender can be disastrous.
A major problem plaguing owners and their counsel is the
mechanic's lien filed even though the claimant or general contractor
has executed and duly filed an agreement or stipulation not to
file any liens. This article will examine the consequences of an
unfounded filing and discuss the various procedures available
for the protection of owners and lenders in light of recent legal
developments.
NATURE OF THE MECHANIC'S LIEN
The Pennsylvania mechanic's lien is a statutory security device
for enforcing the payment of claims which arise from contribu-
tions of labor and materials to the property against whch the lien
is filed.2 The lien may be filed for debts owed by the owner to
the contractor, or by the contractor to any subcontractors for labor
or materials furnished in the erection, construction, alteration or
repair of the improvement.3 The statutory remedy is in rem and
does not derogate from any other available remedies such as an
action in assumpsit.
4
* B.S., 1953, LL.B., 1956, University of Pennsylvania; member of the
Pennsylvania Bar; associated with Blank, Rudenko, Klaus and Rome, Phil-
adelphia, Pennsylvania.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, §§ 1101-1902 (1965).
2. See Halowich v. Amminiti, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 306 (C.P. Fayette
1958), aff'd per curiam, 190 Pa. Super. 314, 154 A.2d 409 (1959).
3. Laborers and subcontractors or employees of subcontractors have
no right to a lien. Hamilton v. Means, 155 Pa. Super. 245, 38 A.2d 528
(1944); see 12 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE § 54 (1964).
4. See Halowich v. Amminiti, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 306 (C.P. Fayette
1958), aff'd per curiam, 190 Pa. Super. 314, 154 A.2d 409 (1959); 12 STAND-
ARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE § 3 (1964).
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The Mechanics' Lien Law of 19635 and the applicable rules
of civil procedure 6 govern lien procedure. The 1963 Act expressly
repealed its predecessor T but many of the basic provisions of the
earlier act and most of the case law thereunder have been incor-
porated into the new Act. Two significant changes are the mini-
mum lienable amount and the required time for filing. The amount
of the claim must now be in excess of five hundred dollars" and
the claim must be filed within four months of completion of the
claimant's work.9
For "erection or construction of an improvement," the filed
lien takes effect and has priority from the time of visible com-
mencement of construction. 10 "Dating back" priorities is not an
advantage given to many other classes of creditors. Indeed, me-
chanics' lienors who have only made "alterations or repairs" have
priority only from the date the claim is filed." On a construc-
tion project the advantage of "dating back" inures not only to the
contractor or subcontractor who began the job, but to all subcon-
tractors and materialmen retained thereafter. For example, if ex-
cavation is started 12 for the erection of a multi-story office build-
ing before the construction mortgage is recorded, all materialmen
and subcontractors have a lien prior to the mortgage. A material-
man supplying wallpaper13 under a contract made a year later
can obtain the same priority as the excavator, 14 and he has four
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, §§ 1101-1902 (1965).
6. PA. R. Civ. P. 1651-1660.
7. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1901 (1965).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1301 (1965). Under prior law, a lien for
repairs or alterations could be filed for a sum exceeding one hundred dol-
lars. Act of June 4, 1901, P.L. 431, § 2. There was no statutory limit on
claims for new construction.
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1502(a) (1) (1965). Prior law placed a
limitation of three months for alterations and repairs, and of six months
in most other cases. Act of June 4, 1901, P.L. 431, § 10.
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1508(a) (1965). Excavation may consti-
tute "commencement," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, §§ 1201(12) (a),(b), (1965),
but not making test borings, see Dagit v. Radnor Convales. Home, Inc., 38
Pa. D. & C.2d 389 (C.P. Del. 1966), or "staking out" the ground, see Roy
B. & L. Ass'n v. King, 17 Pa. D. & C. 83 (C.P. Del. 1931).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1508(b) (1965).
12. See note 10 supra.
13. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1201(7) (1965). Section 1201 defines
"materials" as "building materials and supplies of all kinds, and also in-
cludes fixtures, machinery and equipment reasonably necessary to and
incorporated into the improvement." This provision was intended to fol-
low existing law. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1301 (1965), Comment, Joint
State Government Commission. The previous statute specifically provided
that, inter alia, "paperhanging, grates, furnaces, heaters, boilers, engines,
chandeliers, brackets, gas and electric pipes, wires and fixtures" were all
lienable items. Act of June 4, 1901, P.L. 431, § 2 (emphasis added).
14. The 1963 Act establishes no priority among lien claimants as did
the 1901 Act. Therefore, all mechanics' liens would share ratably, irre-
spective of when the work on each claim was performed. See 12 STANDARD
PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE § 291 (1964).
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months after completion to file his lien.
Since the time of priority is determined by the nature of the
work done on the improvement, it is very important to distinguish
between "erection and construction"' 5 and "alterations and re-
pairs."'6 Unfortunately, this is a difficult area of the Mechanics'
Lien Law and the distinction between "construction" and "altera-
tion" is not always clear.'1 The increasing pace of rehabilitation
of existing structures in many large cities will make the problem
even more significant.
Unlike many other states, the Pennsylvania Act permits the
right of lien to be defeated by a no-lien stipulation, commonly
called a "mechanic's lien waiver."' 8 The prudent owner will usu-
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1301 (1965).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1201 (1965). The distinction is also sig-
nificant procedurally because under section 1501 (a) no claim for "altera-
tions or repairs" is valid if by a subcontractor unless a preliminary notice
to file a claim therefor is given within a specified time and in a prescribed
manner. For the effect of this distinction with respect to federal tax lien
priorities see Comment, The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966: A Correlation
With Pennsylvania Law, 72 DICK. L. REV. 144, 156-57 (1967).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1201(10),(11) (1965):
"Erection and construction" means the erection and the construc-
tion of a new improvement or of a substantial addition to an exist-
ing improvement, or any adaptation of an existing improvement
rendering the same fit for a new or distinct use and effecting a
material change in the interior or exterior thereof. ,
"Alteration and repair" means any alteration or repair of an exist-
ing improvement which does not constitute erection or construc-
tion as defined herein.
The Comment of the Joint State Government Commission states that the
1901 Act contained no express definitions for the above terms. However,
"no change in the law is intended."' PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1201 (1965),
Comments 10 & 11. For a summary of the cases in this area see CusHmAN,
MECHANICS' LIENS IN PENNSYLVANIA 240 et seq. (1926); 12 STANDARD PENN-
SYLVANIA PRACtiCE §§ 21, 22 (1964). Substantial work may constitute
"alterations and repairs." In Malone v. Hossfeld, 53 Pa. Super. 134 (1913),
1237 Vine Street, Philadelphia, was an old three story brick building with
a store in the front of the first floor and a dwelling throughout the rest of
the building. 1235 Vine Street was a commercial or manufacturing build-
ing with an office on the first floor. The two buildings were practically
made into one; all the partitions at 1237 were removed; all the floors were
either raised or lowered and a new brick addition was made upon stone
foundations. On the first floor of 1237 a new window Was constructed, and
on the second and third floor fronts, the dwelling house windows were cut
down to the level of the floors to make doors out of them. The stairs were
torn out, one floor completely removed and two-thirds of the roof put on
new. The building was no longer a store and dwelling, but a part of the
manufacturing building connected with 1235 Vine Street by a number of
openings in the party walls. The first floor front was finished so that the
face of both 1235 and 1237 was a single office, without sign of a division
line. See Lauriello v. Calio, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 93 (C.P. Phila. 1962).
18. For an analysis of the treatment of these waivers in other states
see Note, Mechanics' Liens and Surety Bonds in the Building Trades, 68
YALE L.J. 138, 157-59 (1958). The Note states that in some states, such as
New York, exculpatory clauses are not recognized under certain circum-
Winter 1968]
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ally require contractors to execute these waivers before work be-
gins. Virtually all title insurance companies require the filing of
waivers before issuing insurance to construction lenders, and archi-
tects preparing bid proposals frequently include a requirement that
waivers be executed and filed. Many printed forms of construc-
tion contracts presently incorporate detailed waiver language. 9
The net result is that the legislature has given the contractor a
security device which is largely ineffective unless the owner has
little bargaining position, is poorly advised, or makes some technical
error in the execution or filing of the waiver. Even when a waiver
has been properly filed, desperate contractors will often attempt to
pressure settlements by filing liens.
ATTEnTED METHODS OF REMOVING THE Lmq
This section will consider the somewhat unsatisfactory devices
available to discharge or discourage a lien filed despite the execu-
tion of a waiver. For purposes of analysis they may be grouped
into the following categories: (1) statutory security, (2) methods
of summary dismissal, (3) power of attorney to strike, and (4)
miscellaneous deterrents.
Statutory Security
The Act provides that a lien may be discharged by depositing
with the court a sum equal to the amount of the claim for applica-
stances. The writer reasons that in New York, since the owner is never
liable beyond the amount due the general contractor, the added protection
of a disclaimer is probably unnecessary. In Pennsylvania and other states,
however, the owner's direct liability to all lien holders can be well beyond
the amount due the general contractor and recognition of the waiver of the
right to file a mechanic's lien becomes of great importance to the owner.
19. One typical clause follows:
Contractor, for himself, herself, itself, themselves, his, her, its and
their subcontractors, and all parties acting through or under him,
it or them, covenants and degrees that no mechanics' claims or
liens shall be filed or maintained by him, them, or any of them
against the buildings and the lots of ground appurtenant thereto,
or any of them, for or on account of any work done or materials
furnished by him, them or any of them, under this contract or
otherwise, for towards, in or about the erection and construction
of the said buildings, or any of them, and Contractor, for himself,
herself, itself, themselves, his, her, its and their subcontractors,
and others under him, her, it or them, hereby expressly waives
and relinquishes the right to have, file, or maintain any mechanics'
lien or claim against the buildings or any of them, and that this
agreement waiving the right of lien shall be an independent cove-
nant and shall operate and be effective as well with respect to
work and labor done and materials furnished under any supple-
mental contract, verbal or written, or contract for extra work in
the erection and construction of the said buildings as to work and
labor done and materials furnished under this conratet.
Many printed waiver forms require the signature of the contractor and the
owner. The Act, however, makes it clear that the owner's signature is not
required. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1401-02 (1965).
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tion to the amount finally determined to be due.20 The lien may
also be discharged by entering "security" in double the amount of
the required deposit, or such lesser amount as the court approves,
but in no event less than the amount of the required deposit.
21
This procedure would appear to provide a happy compromise of
equities. If security is placed with the court, the claimant has sub-
stituted security for the discharged lien pending resolution of
the factual issues. At the same time, the owner may proceed with
sale or financing unhampered by the lien. In many instances,
however, this is not a practical solution. The owner may urgently
need to discharge the lien because he is attempting to refinance
his project to obtain additional funds. Permitting him to obtain
additional funds only by depositing other funds is obviously no
solution. A bond may be available to some owners for this pur-
pose, but many will be unable to obtain a bond without posting
substantial security with the bonding company. Even if a bond
is available, the premium will be an unanticipated cost of con-
struction.
The problem becomes more formidable when the lien is filed in
a substantial amount. For leverage purposes subcontractors may
claim sums even in excess of their contract price. One of the
last things litigated is the amount due the claimant, and experi-
ence indicates that the amount of the claim, inflated or not, is
unlikely to be reduced on pretrial motion for the purpose of com-
puting statutory security. Before the 1963 Act, intentional filing
of a claim for a "grossly excessive amount" could be a ground for
defeating the entire claim.22 This defense is apparently unavail-
able as a deterrent under the new Act.
23
Even when an owner is current in his payments to the general
contractor, if the latter is not paying his subcontractors, the
amounts previously paid by the owner will not be credited against
the subcontractors' claims. 24 This problem was theoretically solved
by section 405 of the Mechanics' Lien Act:
Right of owner to limit claims to unpaid balance of con-
tract price. Where there has been no waiver of liens and
the claims of subcontractors exceed in the aggregate the
unpaid balance of the contract price specified in the con-
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1510(a) (1965).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1510(d) (1965).
22. Act of June 4, 1901, P.L. 431, § 36.
23. "The provisions of [section 36 of the 1901 Act] providing that the
filing of a claim for a grossly excessive amount could defeat the entire
claim are omitted, thus changing prior practice." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49,
§ 1701(e) (1965), Comment of the Joint State Government Commission.
24. See Bryan v. Stempkowski, 88 Pa. Super. 390 (1926). This is not
the rule in many states. See Cushman, Mechanics' Liens and Public Works
Bonds in Pennsylvania, 59 Dicx. L. REV. 99 (1955); Note, Mechanics' Liens




tract between the owner and the contractor, then if the
subcontractor has actual notice of the total amount of said
contract price and of its provisions for the time or times
for payment thereof before any labor or materials were fur-
nished by him, or if such contract or the pertinent provi-
sions thereof were filed in the office of the prothonotary
in the time and manner provided in section 402, each claim
shall upon application of the owner, be limited to its pro-
rata share of the contract price remaining unpaid, or which
should have remained unpaid, whichever is greatest in
amount .... 21
Subcontractors, however, are rarely given timely notice of the
general contractor's price and the general contract is almost never
filed in the prothonotary's office. Even if these procedures were
followed, the limitations would not be available against a claim-
ant who in preliminary proceedings claims to be a "contractor" and
not a "subcontractor." Many subcontractors make this very claim,
notwithstanding the filing of a waiver by the "general contractor."26
Methods of Summary Dismissal: Petition to Strike
The petition to strike was the traditional method of discharging
a lien not filed in conformity with the Act. Often the courts
discharged liens because of relatively minor failures of the claimant
to follow the Act precisely.27 In these cases the court looked to
the record and made the determination to strike summarily. But
if the grounds for striking did not relate to failure to conform to
the Act, the courts usually refused to act on a summary basis.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1405 (1965) (emphasis added).
26. See cases cited note 67 infra.
27. In Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Blocked Iron Corp. of America, 394
Pa. 386, 147 A.2d 332 (1959), the court affirmed per curiam a lower court
decision in which the claimant filed a mechanics' lien claim and served it
on the defendant's attorney, who accepted service. However, the claim-
ant's attorney failed to file the affidavit of acceptance of notice, and even
though no third party rights were affected by this failure, the lien was
stricken. In Kauffman v. Chapelski, 33 Pa. D. & C.2d 16 (C.P. Northumb.
1963), not only did the attorney for the defendant accept service of the
notice, but he did so by letter addressed to the plaintiff's attorney and the
letter was included in the copy of the notice filed of record. Even there
the claim was stricken. In Hoffman Lumber Co. v. Geesey, 35 Pa. D. & C.2d
200 (C.P. Chester 1963), the sheriff served the claim and even filed his
return of service with the prothonotary, using the standard form for mak-
ing returns of service of writs of summons. However, he did not conform
to the Act in that he attached no affidavit to the return. In this case, too,
the lien was stricken. Some of the cases involving service on a husband
and wife seem equally strict. See Hamilton v. Le Sueur, 46 Pa. D. & C.
516 (C.P. Erie 1942) (service made on wife at her place of business and on
the wife in behalf of the husband at the same place); A. D. Rossie, Inc. v.
Drew, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 589 (C.P. Allegh. 1954) (wife received notice by reg-




In Hiestand v. Keath28 the owner petitioned to strike a lien
filed against a two-story double framed dwelling allegedly in vio-
lation of the Lien Act. The statute provided that a single claim
should not be filed against more than one structure if they are not
intended to form one "plant." Although the facts were stipulated,
the supreme court held that this was not a question to be deter-
mined summarily and that matters "dehors the record" could not
be placed before the court in this manner.29 This reasoning was
followed in the recent case of Dunham-Bush, Inc. v. Murray's 51
Lanes, Inc.,30 in which the owner entered into a contract with a
general contractor and duly filed the contractor's waiver. Appar-
ently the contractor did not order materials from the claimant
until more than ten days after the filing. A waiver filed either
before work began or ten days before the date of claimant's con-
tract would be a complete defense to the claim.3 ' The claimant
admitted the filing of the waiver but denied its validity because he
was allegedly without information sufficient to know whether the
stipulation was filed more than ten days before the order. The
invoice attached to the claimant's lien, however, indicated that the
contractor did not order materials until after the ten day period
and the lien itself stated that "visible commencement of the work"
followed the admitted date of filing.
The owner argued that the invoice, the allegations of the date
of visible commencement, plus the admission of the existence and
filing of the waiver made the key facts an integral part of the rec-
ord. Therefore, the lien should be stricken. The court, however,
cited various Pennsylvania cases which follow the "inexorable"
rule that the court must not venture outside the record and held
that the waiver was "dehors the record. ' 2 Matters of defense
must be interposed only "on the trial under proper pleadings. '3
3
Apparently it makes no difference whether the facts are un-
disputed as a result of discovery proceedings, stipulations, or even
28. 229 Pa. 149, 78 A. 40 (1910).
29. In a well reasoned dissent, Justice Moschisker quoted from a pre-
vious leading case: "An owner, then having a sound defense, resting on
matters of fact dehors the record, could but file his Affidavit of Defense to
the Scieri Facias and enter his plea. He then was obliged to wait until his
case was reached for trial, although, in the meantime, his property was
encumbered with a lien which ought never to have been filed. . . ." Id. at
160, 78 A. at 43. The majority opinion emphasized that the procedure by
scieri facias was as "speedy and efficacious" as by petition and rule. That
was in 1910. We live in an era in which cases may take four years or more
to come to trial in Philadelphia, and a summary proceeding is a substan-
tially speedier method of terminating litigation.
30. 412 Pa. 424, 194 A.2d 887 (1963). See 26 U. PrrT. L. Rxv. 301, 306
(1964).
31. See note 65 infra and accompanying text.




affidavits, allegations or admissions in the pleadings themselves.
8 4
Waivers of mechanics' liens are "dehors the record," period.
Preliminary Objections Under The 1963 Act
Lien filing procedure is governed by the Mechanics' Lien Act of
1963, but the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 5 govern pro-
cedure between the filing and reduction of the claim to judgment.
The claimant must proceed after filing by complaint or amicable
action, 8 and thereafter generally as in assumpsit.
The 1963 Act introduced a new concept of preliminary objec-
tions to the claim. Section 505 provides:
Any party may preliminarily object to a claim upon a
showing of exemption or immunity of the property from
lien, or for lack of conformity with this Act. The Court
shall determine all preliminary objections and if an issue
of fact is raised in such objections, the Court may take
evidence by deposition or by otherwise. .... .7
Unfortunately, the Comment of the Joint State Government Com-
mission 8 is of little help in ascertaining what this section means.
Obviously the defense of "lack of conformity" is intended to
incorporate the claimant's failure to comply with the requirements
for raising and perfecting the lien when the defects are apparent
on the record.3 9 These defects were customarily raised by petition
to strike off the lien or by a demurrer to the scire facias.40 The
question now is what additional defenses may be raised preliminar-
ily by virtue of "exemption or immunity of the property from
lien." Since these terms are neither defined nor used elsewhere in
the Act, the courts have inherited the task.
The argument has been made that when an appropriate waiver
is signed by the general contractor and timely filed, the property
is exempt or immune from the lien of the general contractor and
his subcontractors. However, the Act says the "property" must
be exempt "from lien," and of course other contractors dealing
directly with the owner may maintain liens against his property
despite such a waiver. In light of this fact and the traditionally
accepted procedure for raising waivers as a defense, the courts
34. But cf. Miller v. Harzon, 42 Lanc. L. Rev. 25 (C.P. Pa. 1929);
Short & Wade v. Cole, 31 Pitts Leg. J. 409 (C.P. Pa. 1901); Taylor-Duryea
Lumber Co. v. Rabinowitz, 43 York L. Rec. 101 (C.P. Pa. 1929); Goodling
v. Hellan Distilling Co., 25 York L. Rec. 53 (C.P. Pa. 1911).
35. PA. R. Civ. P. 1651-60.
36. PA. R. CIV. P. 1653.
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1505 (1965)(emphasis added).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1505 (1965), Comment of the Joint State
Government Commission.
39. See Grimes v. Barnes, 85 Montg. 305 (C.P. Pa. 1965).




are not influenced by this argument. 4
1
That a statute should be construed, if possible, to give effect to
all its provisions is axiomatic, however, and in ascertaining legisla-
tive intent it may be presumed that the legislature intended all
words to be effective. 42 Therefore, recent decisions have looked to
section 303 of the Act to determine what defenses may properly be
raised by preliminary objections. 4 Section 303 sets forth the cir-
cumstances under which liens are "not allowed":
(a) in favor of any person other than a contractor or
subcontractor, as defined herein ...
(b) for labor or materials furnished for a purely pub-
lic purpose.
(c) [when] the property [is] conveyed in good faith
for a valuable consideration prior to the filing of a claim
for alterations or repairs ...
(d) by reason of any consent given. . . to a tenant to
improve the leased premises . . . unless . . . in writing.
(e) for that portion of a debt representing the con-
tract price of any materials against which the claimant
holds ... a security interest. .... 44
Although "exemption [s] or immunit [ies]" are not mentioned
in section 303, the legislature possibly intended to incorporate this
section within the meaning of those words, thereby permitting
these defenses to be raised on preliminary objections.45 In Brand-
41. This argument was recently rejected in Brandley v. Mitchell Dev.
Corp., 89 Montg. 1, 2-3 (C.P. Pa. 1967), and Nuss v. Malen, 89 Montg. 55,
56 (C.P. Pa. 1967). Although this problem was not specifically discussed
in the Hollander case, see text accompanying notes 53-62 infra, were it not
for the applicability of rule 1035, the court obviously would not have per-
mitted summary action, notwithstanding section 505. See also 12 STANDARD
PENNSYLVANrA PRACTICE § 198 (1964): "[I]t would seem that the existence
of a no-lien contract is not ground for preliminary objection to the claim,
there being nothing in the statute to indicate that the existence of a no-lien
contract either renders the property exempt from lien or renders the claim
invalid for lack of conformity to the statute."
42. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 562(4) (1952); Reese v. Hemphill, 411
Pa. 263, 191 A.2d 835 (1963).
43. See Brandley v. Mitchell Dev. Corp., 89 Montg. 1 (C.P. Pa. 1967);
Nuss v. Malen, 89 Montg. 55 (C.P. Pa. 1967).
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1303 (1965).
45. The "good faith purchaser" exception in section 303(c) is a little-
known defense with interesting implications. When construction has
taken place within four months of a real estate closing, the title company
will be taking an additional risk by insuring against mechanics' liens.
Therefore, in many cases title companies charge an extra premium of one-
half of one per cent on the amount insured in order to place such insur-
ance. After a sale made in "good faith," however, no claim may be filed
for "alterations or repairs." Therefore, if there are "alterations or repairs"
as opposed to "erection and construction," the title company is theoretically
insuring against a claim which cannot possibly prevail. The difficulty, of
course, especially with respect to rehabilitation and redevelopment of ex-
isting properties, is that there could be a real factual issue as to the nature
Winter 1968]
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ley v. Mitchell Development Corp.,46 a common pleas court reasoned
that section 303 embodied the "exemptions and immunities" re-
ferred to in section 505, but since waivers were not included, the
validity of a filed waiver of lien could not be raised on preliminary
objections. The court ruled that waivers must be raised as a de-
fense to the claim in responsive pleadings.
Apparently the legislature intended only the "public purpose"
defense in section 303(b) and property exempted by general sub-
stantive law (e.g., that owned by minors and incompetents) to be
encompassed by the words "exemption or immunity. '47
In any event, preliminary objections seemingly will not be of
assistance to an owner attempting to enforce a waiver by summary
discharge of a filed lien.
Power of Attorney-The Owner's "Placebo"
In the absence of an effective method of summary dismissal, it
was inevitable that imaginative lawyers would attempt other
means of removing a mechanic's lien. A form of waiver of me-
chanics' liens was devised which contained an irrevocable warrant
empowering any attorney to appear for the claimant and mark
any mechanic's lien satisfied of record at claimant's cost. In
McCarthy v. Reese48 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently
held such a power of attorney invalid and unenforceable. The court
reasoned that discharging a mechanic's lien by a "waiver of attorney
is not permitted by the statute and, therefore, it is forbidden." 4
Three dissenting justices characterized this reasoning as "specious"50
and said that the majority placed an arbitrary and unnecessary
restriction upon the rights of parties to contract freely.
Many printed waiver forms still incorporate power of attorney
language, however, despite the unenforceability of these clauses.
Perhaps some psychological benefit is derived even from an in-
effective antidote, and someday it may work.
of the work. Also, it has been suggested that the question whether there
is a "good faith" conveyance may be raised. (See Report of Proceedings
43rd Annual Convention of the Penna. Title Association, May 28 to 29,
1964, p. 52) When these prospective factual issues are not likely to present
any problem, because it is clear that minor repairs have been made and
that the purchaser is a legitimate third party, the title companies should
take this into consideration in setting the premium.
46. 89 Montg. 1 (C.P. Pa. 1967).
47. The Joint State Government Commission's Comment to section
303(b) implies that this was the intent:
Subsection (b) [is] taken from § 2, Act of 1901, 40 P.S. 22. The
express references of that section exempting property of lunatics,
guardians of minors, or trustees, unless the work was undertaken
by authority of the court or of power contained in the deed or will,
are omitted as unnecessary since these are matters of general sub-
stantive law .... (emphasis added).
48. 419 Pa. 489, 215 A.2d 257 (1965).





A claimant who has executed a waiver of lien may file a lien
merely to cloud the title in order to exact a settlement from the
owner. If the lienor loses the action because of the waiver, a
remedy in assumpsit remains, so he has nothing to lose by filing
and everything to gain. Whether an action of malicious use of
process or abuse of process will succeed against an unsuccessful me-
chanic's lienor under these circumstances is questionable. Al-
though no Pennsylvania cases were found in the area of me-
chanics' liens, other cases have permitted recovery for wrongful
initiation of civil process or wrongful perversion of process after
issuance.51
One possible deterrent against unfounded filing, however, is a
caveat that the contractor will be obligated to pay any expenses of
the owner incident to discharging the lien, including attorneys'
fees. Some building contracts between owners and contractors, or
between contractors and subcontractors, contain provisions simi-
lar to the following:
If the contractor shall file any mechanic's lien, the
owner shall have the right to discharge the lien and to
retain out of any payment then due or thereafter to be-
come due, an amount sufficient to completely indemnify it
against such lien or other claim with interest together
with the expense incident to discharging such lien, in-
cluding any attorneys' fees and disbursements, all of which
the contractor agrees to pay.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently held such a provision
enforceable.52 It is interesting to speculate whether this decision
can be extended to permit recovery of consequential damages re-
sulting from filing; for example, loss of a favorable mortgage
commitment or work stoppage losses caused by a construction
lender's refusal to continue to advance money. This deterrent, of
course, is completely dependent upon the contractor's willingness
to agree to the indemnification provision. If he does not agree,
the owner must resort to other remedies.
Thus, none of the devices examined in this section on at-
tempted methods of removing the lien appear to be completely sat-
isfactory to the owner against whom a lien has been recorded
despite the filing of a waiver. The addition of a new summary
judgment rule to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, how-
ever, may provide a solution.
51. See cases cited in 29 P.L.E. Process § 8 (1960); 1 STANDARD PENN-
SYLVANIA PRAcTc 488 (1964). A problem with the action of misuse of
process is that the plaintiff's property must have been "seized" by the de-
fendant. The mere taking of judgment and ruining the plaintiff's credit
thereby does not constitute a "seizure." See Baird v. Aluminum Steel Co.,
250 F.2d 595, 602 (3rd Cir. 1957).




THE IMPACT OF NEw SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS ON
MECHANICS' LIENS-RULE 1035 AND THE HOLLANDER CASE
The recent common pleas case Gauntlett Equipment Co. v.
Hollander 3 involved a dispute between an apartment building
owner and a heating and air conditioning contractor who filed a
substantial mechanic's lien against the building. Gauntlett did
not finish the heating and air conditioning work and another firm
ultimately completed it at Hollander's expense. Hollander's de-
fense on the merits was that Gauntlett had breached its contract
and therefore owed him or his general contractor the difference be-
tween the contract price and the eventual cost of completion.
Before construction began, Hollander entered into a written
contract with the Clinton Construction Company, which acted as the
general contractor. The directors and officers of Clinton were Mr.
Hollander and his mother. Clinton subcontracted with Gauntlett
and issued its checks or vouchers for payment as the job prog-
ressed."4 Before construction started, a waiver was filed with the
prothonotary in the customary form whereby Clinton, in its own
behalf and in behalf of all subcontractors and materialmen, agreed
not to file any mechanics' liens.55 Gauntlett also executed and de-
livered a similar waiver, which was not filed.5
After Gauntlett filed a mechanic's lien claim, Hollander
moved to strike the lien on the basis of the filed waiver by pre-
liminary objections under section 505 of the Mechanics' Lien Law.
Apparently relying on the Dunham-Bush reasoning T that lien
waivers were "dehors the record," however, the judge refused to
strike the lien and dismissed the preliminary objections.
The parties had not completed depositions in preparation for a
hearing on the merits when resolution of the issue became critical
for Hollander. The construction mortgage under which he had
borrowed funds for construction costs was coming due and his
permanent "take out" commitment was expiring.58 As is custom-
ary, the permanent lender required the property to be free of all
liens and encumbrances. Therefore, if the Gauntlett lien were not
removed, default under the construction mortgage would have been
53. Mechanic's Lien Docket No. 1204 (C.P. No. 6, Philadelphia County,
Sept. 27, 1966) (appeal withdrawn Nov. 1, 1967).
54. Id. at 3, 4.
55. Gauntlett contended that the waiver between Hollander and Clin-
ton was invalid because it was made with "one not intended in good faith
to be a contractor," see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1407 (1965), and that
Clinton was the owner's "alter ego." The court disposed of this issue,
however, by assuming that Gauntlett was correct. Id. at 5, 6.
56. An additional problem was that the signature on the waiver pur-
portedly signed by the Gauntlett Equipment Co. was signed only by Robert
C. Gauntlett and there was no designation of his corporate capacity after
the signature. Id. at 3, 7, 8.
57. See id. at 1 n.1.
58. Id. at 4.
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imminent. The owner would lose everything because of a me-
chanic's lien which had not yet been litigated on the merits. The
situation was even more frustrating because the claimant had
agreed in writing not to file a lien. Furthermore, after a hearing
the owner might turn out to be a creditor rather than a debtor.
Under these circumstances, Hollander's attorney moved for
summary dismissal of the lien under rule 1035 of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure, which had been adopted since the prior
ruling on preliminary objections.5" Apparently this was the first
time the new rule had been invoked in this context. The court
agreed with the application of rule 1035 and struck the lien in
what may have been the most significant Pennsylvania decision
on mechanics' liens in recent years. The court said:
In opposition to these waivers executed on its own
behalf, plaintiff has submitted only an affidavit making a
bare general denial of the validity of such waivers. Plain-
tiff does not deny their physical existence, nor their con-
tent and sufficiency of language, nor the genuineness of
its president's signature; nor does plaintiff assert that the
signature was obtained by fraud or duress, or that its presi-
dent lacked authority to sign. Such a bare denial is insuf-
ficient to raise a factual issue which would prevent the
entry of a summary judgment. This is clear from Rule
1035.60
The court then quoted rule 1035 (d):
[W]hen a motion for summary judgment is made'and
supported as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his plead-
ing, but his response, by affidavit or as otherwise pro-
vided in this Rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, should be en-
tered against him.0 1
The Ho!lander decision is certainly consistent w "ith recent
efforts to remove from congested dockets those cases which can be
decided as a matter of law. Moreover, although not mentioned in
the decision, section 701(a) of the Act provides: "The practice and
procedure to obtain judgment on a claim filed shall be governed by
the Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court.
'62
Section 701(a) intended the practice in mechanic's lien matters to
conform as much as possible to the practice in assumpsit. There-
59. The prior ruling was in September 1965. Rule 1035 became ef-
fective May 9, 1966. See id. at 1 n.1, 5.
60. Id. at 6.
61. Id. The court explained that subsection (d) of rule 1035 is adapted
from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tiantadosi v. Loew's, Inc.,
137 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1923); Williams v. W. R. Grace & Co., 247 F.
Supp. 433, 435 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1701 (1965).
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fore, it seems fitting that rule 1035 be applied to discharge a me-
chanic's lien filed despite a no-lien stipulation. When the claim-
ant admits that he signed a waiver and there is no genuine factual
issue, the litigation should be promptly terminated. Prompt reso-
lution of mechanics' liens cases assumes even more importance
because, as noted, failure to remove the lien may make a later
decision on the merits moot so far as the owner is concerned.
6 3
The Waiver and the Factual Issue Under Rule 1035
The Hollander case indicates that facts concerning the waiver
of lien are not conclusively "dehors the record" and that if no
genuine "factual issue" exists, the lien may be stricken. The
operable issue has been subtly altered from "dehors the record" to
"factual issue" with the advent of rule 1035.
To appreciate a "factual issue," it must be understood that
the Act sets forth two categories of waivers which might be called
"direct waiver by the claimant" and "notice waiver by the gen-
eral contractor." Section 401 provides: "A contractor or subcon-
tractor may waive his right to file a claim by a written instrument
signed by him or by any conduct which operates equitably to estop
such contractor or subcontractor from filing a claim. '6 4 Section
402 provides:
A written contract between the owner and contractor
or a separate written instrument signed by the contractor,
which provides that no claim shall be filed by anyone,
shall be binding; but the only admissible evidence thereof,
as against a subcontractor, shall be proof of actual notice
thereof to him before any labor or materials were furnished
by him; or proof that such contract or separate written in-
strument was filed in the office of the Prothonotary prior
to the commencement of the work upon the ground or
within ten (10) days after the execution of the principal
contract or not less than ten (10) days prior to the con-
tract with the claimant subcontractor .... 65
A notice waiver, then, will bind a subcontractor or materialman
without actual notice to him only when filed:
1. Prior to commencement of work on the ground, or
2. Within ten days after execution of the principal con-
contract, or
3. Not less than ten days prior to the execution of the
claimant's contract.
Since these requirements are stated in the alternative, compli-
ance with any one of them will bind the contractor. 6
63. See pages 238-39 infra.
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1401 (1965).
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1402 (1965).
66. See Deets v. Freed, 165 Pa. Super. 496, 69 A.2d 159 (1949).
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When the owner relies on waiver by notice, many factual issues
are obviously available to the claimant. For example, the waiver
will not be binding if its filing was not timely. Factual issues can
be raised concerning when work commenced, when the contracts
were executed, when the waiver was filed, or whether the claim-
ant is a "subcontractor" or a "contractor" within the meaning of the
Act.6 7 The claimant may allege that he dealt directly with the
owner, either for all work or for "extras" or additional work, even
though he had a written contract with the general contractor. He
may claim that the waiver was made by one not intended "in
good faith" to be a "contractor," 68 or that it was procured by
false or fraudulent means.60
One procedure with startling implications concerns the owner's
formation and use of a closed corporation as the general contractor.
The officers of the general contractor, therefore, may have an
identity of interest with the owner and the owner frequently is as
actively involved in the project as the general contractor. The
owner may employ this procedure in the belief that his property
will be insulated against possible liens. In reality, this arrange-
ment is unlikely to help him and the waivers may be successfully
attacked if a claim is filed. Such an attack was made in the
Hollander case, in which the claimant contended that the general
contractor was the owner's "alter-ego." 0
In any event, these factual issues certainly will not be decided
summarily. If the owner relies on the claimant's direct waiver as
in the Hollander case, however, most of these prospective factual
issues are eliminated and it becomes more difficult for the claimant
to avoid summary judgment.7
67. See, e.g., Camden Wood Turning Co. v. Malcolm, 190 Pa. 62, 42
A. 458 (1899); Bohem & Bros. v. Seel, 185 Pa. 382, 39 A. 1009 (1898); McFall
v. McKeesport & Yough. Ice Co., 123 Pa. 253,, 16 A. 478 (1888); Brennan
v. Kennedy, 69 Pa. Super. 77 (1918); McCune v. Hatch, 18 Pa. Super. 469
(1901).
68. Section 407 of the Act provides: "A contract for the improvement
made by the owner with one not intended in good faith to be a contractor
shall have no legal effect except as between the parties thereto, even though
written, signed and filed as provided herein, but such contractor, as to
third parties, shall be treated as the agent of the owner." See Ballman v.
Heron, 169 Pa. 510 (1895); Brennan v. Kennedy, 69 Pa. Super. (1918);
Brandley v. Mitchell Dev. Corp., 89 Montg. 1 (C.P. Pa. 1967);. Vanzin v.
Sargo, 106 P.L.J. 151 (C.P. Pa. 1957).
69. See Van Sciver v. Churchhill, 35 Pa. Super. 212 (1908) (false
statement by owner as to the amount of the existing mortgage); Jones,
Inc. v. 57 Corp., 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 493 (C.P. Phila. 1954) (owner's promise to
provide an escrow account to cover the amount of the contract).
70. See also cases cited in note 67 supra.
71. Even when there is not a "good faith" contractor, the claimant
who signed the waiver cannot avail himself of this defense under section
407. See Toll v. Beckerman, 299 Pa. 1, 148 A. 904 (1930); cf. Westmoreland
Guarantee B. & L. Ass'n v. Connor, 216 Pa. 543, 65 A. 1089 (1907). There is
no doubt, however, that an issue could be created over whether the waiver
was obtained by fraudulent means. See cases cited in note 69 supra.
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THE LIEN AND THE CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGE-ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS
Aside from obstructing a pending closing on a permanent
mortgage, as in the Hollander case, the mechanic's lien which can-
not be promptly discharged has the obvious consequence of pre-
venting the owner from raising additional money by secondary
mortgage financing at a time when his need may be most critical.
A second mortgage would be junior to the filed lien in priority and
a prospective lender probably would be unwilling to advance addi-
tional funds to complete a project without first having the lien
discharged. The irony is that often a builder needs additional
money because he has had a disagreement with an unsatisfactory
claimant, discharged him, and unexpectedly must hire another con-
tractor to finish the claimant's work at an increased cost.
More subtle problems result from the interplay between the
filed lien and the mortgage documentation used by many lenders.
First, many mortgage forms provide that a lien filed against the
realty, even though junior to the mortgage, will effect a default.
Under threat of foreclosure, an owner may be forced to settle a
lien claim that has little merit. A second troublesome area is the
relationship of the advance money mortgage to the mechanic's
lien. The practice in many parts of Pennsylvania is to employ a
procedure which bolsters the priority of the construction mortgage
regardless of the validity or enforceability of waivers of lien.
For example, a Philadelphia title company asked to insure a con-
struction mortgage will make sure that it is filed before any work
is begun and will examine and file the general contractor's
waiver, preferably the day after the mortgage is recorded. Fur-
ther, the company will secure photographs of the premises to show
that there was no "visible commencement" of construction as of the
date the mortgage was filed. The photographs will be signed on the
reverse side by the photographer, certifying the location of the
premises and the date of the photographs. T2 If this procedure is
followed, the potential claimant is in a very weak position to urge
that his lien pre-dates the bona fide construction mortgage.
Additional important areas of concern remain for the prudent
lender. Although obligatory advances of construction money pur-
suant to a bona fide construction mortgage have priority from the
date of recording,73 what is an "obligatory" advance? In Housing
Mortgage Corp. v. Allied Construction, Inc.,74 a construction
72. One company even recommends that the owner and general con-
tractor should be included in the photograph and that they execute an
affidavit that no work has commenced on the premises as of the date of the
photograph. The importance of this procedure is to establish proof of
identity of the property, since a photograph of vacant ground of itself
does not establish location if challenged in court.
73. See Land Title & Tr. Co. v. Shoemaker, 257 Pa. 213, 101 A. 335
(1917); Taylor v. Cornelius, 6D Pa. 187 (1869); Maroney's Appeal, 24 Pa.
372 (1855).
74. 374 Pa. 312, 97 A.2d 802 (1953).
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lender did not insist upon strict compliance with the terms of the
loan agreement and advanced certain stage payments before they
were due. The owner went into bankruptcy and a contest arose
between the construction lender and a prior mortgagee whose mort-
gage had been subordinated to the lien of the construction mort-
gage. The court held that premature advances were not "obliga-
tory" and did not relate back to the date of the construction mort-
gage, but were junior to the subordinated mortgage.
75
Many institutional lenders use printed construction loan
documents setting forth detailed requirements and conditions which
the borrower must satisfy during the course of construction.
These include maintaining insurance of various kinds, performing
the work in a workmanlike manner according to the plans and
specifications, and other provisions intended to ensure comple-
tion. 0 One common provision is that if a lien is filed, the lender
has the right to stop making construction advances. Subsequent
advances may be "voluntary" and not "obligatory" under the Hous-
ing Mortgage decision and therefore junior to the mechanic's
lien and any other intervening lien or mortgage. This might occur
even though the mechanic's lien had no merit because the loan
documents forbade the filing of a lien, without reference to its
ultimate validity. If the lender stops making payments, however,
construction funds may be halted at an inconvenient time and the
lender's security for prior advances seriously impaired.77 To fur-
ther complicate the situation, advances could be made without
knowledge of a filed mechanic's lien.78 The lender may be making
advances, believing that they are "obligatory" under the terms of
his mortgage documents, when the advances may have become
"voluntary" because the same documents gave the lender the
option to discontinue payments immediately upon the filing of a
mechanic's lien.
Title insurance on the construction mortgage is not the lender's
solution. The title company will undoubtedly argue that it is
insuring only "obligatory" advances made pursuant to the con-
struction loan documents.
79
75. For additional analysis of the implications of this case see Shine-
house, Real Estate Construction Loans-A Synopsis, PA. BAR. Q., Oct 1961,
at 69. For a summary of cases on this problem in other jurisdictions see
Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 166, 199-203 (1961).
76. Id. at 70.
77. This is especially true when the lender is relying on a lease or
agreement of sale which may be breached if a building is not completed
by a certain date.
78. It is the rare lender that orders a title search before every week-
ly or monthly advance. Indeed, one reason for having the advances date
back to the date of the mortgage is to obviate what might otherwise be a
rather cumbersome and troublesome procedure.
79. This should point up a problem to many lenders concerning their
one-sided forms. There is a certain irony or poetic justice to protecting
yourself so thoroughly that you actually defeat your own purpose.
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TnE ROLE OF TITLE INSURANCE
Title insurance has been and will continue to be used to pro-
tect the owner besieged by mechanics' liens filed despite a waiver.
If the circumstances are explained to the title company and it is
aware of an owner's integrity and financial stability, it may insure
a lender or purchaser against loss, on the personal bond of the
owner, even when the lien is already of record.80 Often the com-
pany is taking little risk because it is in a good position to evalu-
ate the merits of a pending case, especially if it handled the waiver
filing at an earlier settlement and can depend on the financial
statement and bond of the owner. This is not the traditional
function of title companies, however, and the company will render
this service only as an accommodation for a favored customer or
as a matter of public relations. Moreover, although a title com-
pany is willing to cover the lien in the insurance policy, the lien
is still of record and a lender or purchaser who requires title, as
distinguished from title insurance, "free and clear of all liens and
encumbrances" may say that he is not getting what he bargained
for. This is particularly true when the lender or purchaser is
seeking to avoid his commitment.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Owners for whom title companies are unwilling to assume an
added risk will inevitably find themselves attempting to discharge
a lien filed despite a waiver under circumstances which make sum-
mary discharge crucial. The trend inspired by rule 1035 and the
Hollander case should be continued. When no genuine factual
issue exists concerning the waiver, courts should dismiss the lien
summarily.8 '
The foregoing analysis of recent trends in Pennsylvania me-
chanic's lien law prompts other recommendations which should be
followed whenever practical.
1. When the general contractor is a newly formed corporation
created by the owner specifically to deal with subcontractors and
materialmen, the corporate paper work should be carefully pre-
pared to include parties other than the owners as shareholders,
directors and officers. Income, expenditures and other corporate
transactions should be handled as though the corporation were a
separate entity and not merely the "alter ego" of the owner.
Failure to follow this procedure increases the likelihood that a court
80. Title insurance companies often have printed forms of such bonds
which are signed by owners as an inducement to the company to insure
against mechanics' liens even though no lien has been filed, in instances
when there has been construction within the past four months and the
purchaser or lender requires clear title.
81. The claimant, of course, will not be precluded from further action
on the merits. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
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will "pierce the corporate veil" and hold that subcontractors and
materialmen are dealing directly with the owner.82 This will ren-
der the general contractor's waiver ineffective.
2. The owner should insist on obtaining a waiver, not only
from the general contractor, but from all subcontractors and
materialmen. In a large project, this presents a problem of extra
work and administrative detail. In addition, many subcontrac-
tors and materialmen may not be known when construction begins.
The general contractor should be given the primary burden of ob-
taining waivers by including this obligation in his general con-
tract. Often the architect is ignored, but he has a potential claim
and should be required to sign a waiver like any other con-
tractor.83 A recent case84 points up the importance of obtaining a
waiver from even the contractor who works on the sidewalk,
street or sewer.
As previously discussed, if the claimant himself has signed
a waiver, his lien will be barred under section 401 of the Act (the
direct waiver provision) and he may have difficulty asserting a
genuine factual issue on a motion for summary judgment.
3. The building contract with the general contractor, and
when possible with the subcontractors and materialmen, should
contain a provision whereby each agrees not to file a mechanic's
lien and further agrees to indemnify the owner against damages, in-
cluding attorneys' fees, incurred as a result of breach of this
covenant. A contractor who may expose himself to payment of con-
sequential damages will hesitate to file a lien which he has little
chance of preserving. This provision should discourage the me-
chanic's lien filed despite a waiver merely to exact a settlement
from an owner, who upon trial would almost certainly prevail.
4. To protect construction lenders, the procedures with respect
to recording the mortgage, filing the waiver and taking photo-
graphs should be followed when possible. In addition, the con-
struction loan documents of lending institutions should be care-
fully ... . ..ined and rew.ritten whcn necessary to make advances
82. See cases cited in note 67 supra. See also Tucker v. Binstock, 310
Pa. 254, 165 A. 247 (1933); S.G.V. Co. v. S.G.V. Co., 264 Pa. 265, 107 A. 721
(1919). For criteria which can be used to determine whether a subsidiary
should be treated as a separate entity see Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191
(10th Cir. 1940).
83. The 1963 Act added a sentence intended to clarify the existing
decisional law. In defining the "Contractor" the Act provides: "The term
also includes an architect or engineer, who, by contract with the owner,
express or implied, in addition to the preparation of drawings, specifica-
tions and contract documents also superintends or supervises any such
erection, construction, alteration or repair." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, §
1201(4) (1965). See Alan Porter Leed, Inc. v. Du Rite Prod. Co., 366 Pa.
548, 79 A.2d 218 (1951); cf. Dagit v. Radnor Convales. Home, Inc., 38 Pa.
D. & C.2d 389 (C.P. Del. 1966); Stuber v. McGraw Edison Co., 44 Wash. 130
(C.P. Pa. 1963).




"obligatory" despite the owner's failure to complete rather tech-
nical requirements and despite a mechanic's lien filed during the
course of construction. Virtually the same protection could be
obtained by obligating the lender to continue to make advances and
giving him the right to pay the lien or have it removed by pay-
ment into court in accordance with the Act.
It may even be advisable for construction lenders to change
their entire procedure to ensure that no advance is made unless a
title search shows that no liens or encumbrances have been re-
corded. The charge for this "bring down" by the title company
or an attorney would be nominal and the lender would have more
to rely on than the advance money doctrine which determines
priorities by the uncertain standard of whether the advance is
"obligatory."8 5
To evaluate mechanics' lien law generally or to make specific
legislative recommendations is beyond the scope of this article. A
serious flaw seems to exist, however, in a system designed to pro-
tect a particular class of persons, but which permits them to waive
all these protections almost automatically. The contractor today
simply cannot get work on many large projects unless he is willing
to waive his right to file a mechanic's lien. Some writers have
suggested that mechanics' lien laws be repealed and compulsory
bonding systems like those used in governmental projects be sub-
stituted therefor to provide more effective security for the be-
leaguered contractor.8 A committee sponsored by the United
States Department of Commerce drafted a Uniform Mechanics'
Lien Act which would enable an owner to exempt his property
from liens only if he requires the general contractor to obtain ade-
quate bonding.8 Although this Act appears to have had little
impact,88 it is noteworthy that a bill introduced into the Pennsyl-
vania Senate last year, but not reported out of committee,8 9
provided for amendment of the Mechanics' Lien Act to make a
lien waiver ineffective unless a surety bond is posted guaranteeing
payment to contractors and materialmen.90
85. Even this system will not prevent an unfiled mechanic's lien from
taking priority over the non-obligatory advances. If the lien is filed within
four months after completion of the work, its priority will date back to
the date of the visible start of construction in the case of new construction.
This will not show up on a search made at the time of the advance, but
when filed, of course, will be superior to the advance.
86. See Note, Mechanics' Liens and Surety Bonds in the Building
Trades, 68 YALE L.J. 138, 168-71 (1958).
87. UNIFORM MECHANIcs' LIEN ACT § 7 (1932 version), favorably
commented upon by Cushman, supra note 24, at 111.
88. See Note, supra note 86, at 166.
89. S.B. No. 249, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly (introduced Feb. 13,
1967).
90. Section 1. The Act of August 24, 1963 (P.L. 1175), known as the
"Mechanics' Lien Law of 1963," is amended by adding after section 404 a
new section to read:
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On the other hand, the suggestion has been made that because
claimants are frequently sophisticated businessmen, they do not
need lien protections designed for the nineteenth century journey-
man; therefore, the Lien Act should be abolished entirely.91 In the
final analysis, any recommendations for a basic change in the sys-
tem should be based upon detailed studies of the construction in-
dustry, of the respective financial strengths of owners, contrac-
tors and materialmen, and upon a complete analysis of alternative
systems.
Section 404.1. Posting of bond.-Before any no-lien contract
mentioned in any of the foregoing sections of this article shall be
effective, the contractor or owner must also post an approved sure-
ty bond in the amount equal to double the estimated cost of the
improvement with the prothonotary guaranteeing payment of all
labor and material claims against the improvement.
S.B. No. 249, Reg. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly § 1 (1967).
91. See Pennsylvania Land Title Association, Report of Proceedings
at 56 (1964).
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